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Abstract 
This paper examines options for regulatory cooperation in the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and assesses the challenges and opportunities posed by 
regulatory cooperation for consumer protection. It looks at existing approaches to regulatory 
cooperation by referencing a range of case studies. Based on established practice and on the 
European Commission’s recently published proposal on regulatory cooperation, we discuss a 
possible approach that could be adopted in the TTIP. Against the significant potential gains 
from improved regulatory cooperation, one must set the significant challenges of reconciling 
the different regulatory philosophies of the US and the EU as well as some differences in the 
respective approaches to cooperation. In broad terms, this analysis finds that regulatory 
powers on both sides of the Atlantic will not be significantly affected by the TTIP, but suggests 
that European and American legislators will need to ensure that their priorities shape the TTIP 
regulatory cooperation agenda and not the other way around. 
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Investment Partnership: 
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Consumer Protection 
Stephen Woolcock, Barbara Holzer and Petros Kusmu* 
Paper No. 11 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ 
and CEPS Special Report No. 115 / July 2015 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines options for regulatory cooperation within the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and assesses its implications for consumer protection. Its goal 
is to discuss the TTIP’s potential opportunities and challenges and to discuss how it might 
affect the regulatory sovereignty of the respective legislatures. While the analysis focuses on 
the impact on EU regulatory sovereignty, the findings will also be relevant for the US. Will it 
contribute to a lowering of ‘standards’ and consumer protection rules? What will be the impact 
of the use of methods such as equivalence on regulatory requirements? Will the TTIP influence 
the regulatory or legislative agendas and if so, how should the European Parliament ensure 
that its priorities are properly represented? From the European perspective, which will be the 
‘competent body’ representing the EU in any regulatory cooperation body and how can it be 
ensured that this body reflects balanced EU preferences?  
The second section sets the scene by providing a short overview of the EU’s past agreements 
and existing practices in international negotiations, and it also looks specifically at past 
initiatives in transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Against that background, section 3 then 
discusses the opportunities and challenges inherent in the TTIP negotiations in terms of the 
general approach to regulatory cooperation. This includes a discussion of the approach 
proposed in the European Commission’s Textual Proposal of February 2015. Section 4 then 
provides some illustrations of the opportunities and challenges in specific sectors, before the 
final section offers some conclusions. 
2. Past agreements and existing practice 
Regulatory cooperation in the TTIP builds on several existing international agreements, such 
as the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement in the WTO, numerous past transatlantic 
attempts to promote regulatory cooperation and, more recently, initiatives in preferential 
                                                     
* Stephen Woolcock, Head, International Trade Policy Unit, London School of Economics 
Barbara Holzer, Research Assistant, International Trade Policy Unit, London School of Economics  
Petros Kusmu, Research Assistant, LSE International Trade Policy Unit, London School of Economics 
This paper draws on work requested and published by the European Parliament's International Market 
and Consumer Protection (IMCO) Committee: “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP): Challenges and Opportunities for Consumer Protection”, study prepared for the European 
Parliament's Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, June 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_IDA%282015%295
42222). 
2  WOOLCOCK, HOLZER & KUSMU 
 
agreements negotiated by the EU and, to a lesser extent, the US. This section sets the scene for 
the current debate by summarising the experience with other relevant agreements. 
2.1 Shaping multilateral rules  
The EU has led the way in raising awareness of the impact of divergent regulations as a barrier 
to trade. The EU’s so-called ‘new approach’ to such barriers in the 1980s had a significant 
impact on international agreements in the WTO and the work of the international standards-
making bodies, e.g. ISO, CEN and CENELEC. These EU–shaped international agreements are 
incorporated in virtually all PTAs (preferential trading arrangements) and it is expected to be 
reaffirmed in the TTIP.  
The existing international rules take the form of the 1994 TBT Agreement, which contains a 
binding commitment to national treatment (non-discrimination) in the application of 
regulation and conformity assessment, ‘best endeavours’ wording on mutual recognition and 
a Code of Good Practice for standard-making bodies. As experience within the EU has shown, 
however, national treatment does not remove regulatory barriers/trade costs resulting from 
divergent regulations or standards. The GATT Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, also known as the SPS Agreement – covering human, animal and 
plant life and health – seeks to prevent the use of SPS measures that unnecessarily distort trade. 
The SPS Agreement is largely ‘science-based’ but also provides for the use of precaution (Art. 
5(2) SPS). But the SPS Agreement has not prevented transatlantic disputes on GMOs 
(genetically modified organisms) or hormones in beef, etc. Finally, the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) provides a framework for commitments on national treatment and 
mutual recognition, but the option of mutual recognition has seldom been used.  
2.2 Past transatlantic regulatory cooperation initiatives 
In addition to being the main actors shaping existing multilateral rules, the EU and the US 
have engaged in numerous bilateral attempts to promote regulatory cooperation. These have 
taken place within the framework of bilateral cooperation established by the Transatlantic 
Declaration of 1990, a largely politically motivated effort to redouble transatlantic cooperation 
at the end of the cold war. In 1995, a renewed effort to deepen transatlantic economic relations 
resulted in a Joint Action Plan and the New Transatlantic Agenda Task Force, which had, 
among other things, the aim of promoting regulatory cooperation. This resulted in mutual 
recognition agreements on telecommunications equipment, electrical safety, pharmaceutical 
and medical devices and recreational crafts being implemented with varying degrees of 
difficulty (Pelkmans & Correia de Brito, 2015). It is also worth recalling that stakeholder 
dialogues, e.g. the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), the Transatlantic Consumer 
Dialogue (TACD) and the Transatlantic Environment Dialogue (TAED) were established at 
this time with a view to promoting a common understanding of regulation and regulatory 
policy aims. The Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue was also set up to strengthen European 
Parliament–US Congress contacts.  
The limited success of the New Transatlantic Agenda led to a redoubling of efforts in the form 
of the 1998 Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP), which also had an Action Plan, 
including regulatory cooperation. This led to the adoption of a Veterinary Equivalence 
Agreement and the introduction of an ‘early warning system’ to help identify and head-off 
potential conflicts over regulation. These efforts were disappointing, especially the lack of 
progress on mutual recognition, and were not able to head-off trade disputes (European 
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Commission, 2000). In an attempt to reframe the transatlantic trade agenda in a positive light 
following a number of high-profile disputes – stemming in no small measure from differences 
in regulation – the Positive Economic Agenda was launched in 2002. At this time a number of 
new regulatory dialogues were established, such as the Financial Market Regulatory Dialogue 
between DG Market and the US Treasury and Securities and Exchange Commission in 2002 
and the Policy Dialogue on Borders and Transport Security (PDBTS) to address security 
concerns following 9/11. 
Without dwelling on the past (see Chase & Pelkmans, 2015, for an exhaustive list of US-EU 
regulatory cooperation since 1995), it is therefore worth recalling previous efforts at regulatory 
cooperation and learning from them. The broad conclusion is one of rather disappointing 
results due to the difficulty in reconciling the different regulatory philosophies, a lack of 
consistent political support for detailed regulatory work and reluctance on the part of 
legislators to cede any regulatory autonomy. Regulatory requirements in the US and the EU 
result from the respective market structures and well-established consumer preferences that 
make regulatory cooperation inherently difficult. Where regulatory differences result from 
diverging policy choices, it is fair to assume that the reasons that have prevented a closer 
alignment of regulation in the past will not suddenly disappear with the TTIP (Gerstetter, 2014; 
p. 5). Surmounting the ‘transatlantic deadlock’ (Alemanno, 2009, p. 27) will be the main 
challenge for negotiators and regulators on both sides. 
2.3 The EU-Korea FTA 
The EU-Korea agreement reaffirms the parties’ obligations under the TBT Agreement and sets 
out a general aim of joint cooperation in order to avoid unnecessary divergence in regulatory 
approaches (Art 4.3, EU-Korea FTA). It encourages cooperation between public and private 
standards and conformity assessment bodies. 
The approach to technical regulations is based on intensified cooperation. The parties agreed 
to ensure the notification of the other party when a regulatory change is envisaged, allowing 
the other party time to respond and to participate in any formal public consultation. This is 
little more than a requirement to ensure that the TBT commitments are effectively 
implemented, which is not always the case. On voluntary standards, the EU-Korea agreement 
is also not TBT-plus. On conformity assessment, it simply offers a series of alternatives in the 
form of a) the mutual acceptance of the test results of the other party, b) the recognition of the 
conformity assessment of the other party or c) acceptance of suppliers’ declaration of 
conformity. In two respects the EU-Korea agreement is new. It introduces a series of sectoral 
working groups covering, for example, automobiles and parts, machinery, chemicals, etc. 
These working groups report to the Trade Committee (on which the EU is represented by the 
European Commission). Secondly, it introduces TBT Coordinators in each party, who have the 
job of finding speedy remedies in cases of unnecessary barriers to trade, something that is seen 
as helping small- and medium-sized firms in particular. 
With regard to the SPS chapter in the EU-Korea agreement, it reaffirms the existing obligations 
of the parties under the WTO SPS Agreement. In line with the practice established first in the 
EU-Chile FTA, it includes detailed procedures on how principles set out in the SPS Agreement 
can be implemented, for example, equivalence or the designation of disease- or pest-free 
regions. Thus, as for TBTs, the agreement really seeks only to implement more fully the 
existing SPS commitments. 
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With regard to services, the EU-Korea agreement builds on the GATS by encouraging the 
professional bodies responsible for determining qualifications to make recommendations to 
the Trade Committee on mutual recognition. The Trade Committee is then to decide on 
whether to negotiate a mutual recognition agreement that would be negotiated by ‘the 
competent authorities’. A Working Group on Mutual Recognition is also established to 
monitor this aspect of the agreement. 
2.4 The EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) 
The approach employed in CETA is broadly in line with that in the EU-Korea agreement, but 
with a number of innovations. 
On technical regulations (Chapter 6), CETA also reaffirms commitments under the TBT 
agreement, but appears to go further by adding a provision according to which a party may 
request recognition of equivalence with the existing regulation of the other party (Art. 4 (4) 
CETA). In other words, the EU can request Canada to accept EU regulations as equivalent to 
Canadian requirements or vice versa. This request would be considered by the Committee on 
Trade in Goods, which will make recommendations to the (overarching) Trade Committee. In 
CETA, the parties also agree to apply the (voluntary) Code of Good Practice for Standards 
Making Bodies. 
CETA includes separate protocol (as chapter 27 of the draft treaty) on conformity assessment, 
with an Annex. This strengthens the case for mutual recognition of the results of conformity 
assessment by stating that Canada will recognise conformity assessment bodies established in 
the EU if accredited by Canadian authorities or designated by an EU member state. The EU in 
turn agrees to recognise third-party conformity assessment in Canada (i.e. in cases where self-
certification by producers is not allowed). The protocol also identifies priority sectors. 
Included is the safeguard that ‘nothing shall be interpreted as requiring recognition’ of 
conformity assessment. 
On SPS, the CETA follows the same approach as the EU-Korea FTA by reaffirming obligations 
under the existing SPS agreement and then adding detail provisions on how the SPS 
agreement should be applied.  
Likewise in services, CETA adopts the approach of encouraging professional bodies to initiate 
the process of negotiating mutual recognition agreements by making recommendations to the 
Committee on Trade in Services, which will then make a recommendation to the Trade 
Committee.    
Finally, CETA includes the establishment of a Regulatory Cooperation Forum that will have 
the role of promoting cooperation across all sectors. This is perhaps the model for the 
Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB) proposed by the European Commission for TTIP (see 
discussion below). 
2.5 The general approach to recent PTAs in the US 
This section draws primarily on the KORUS agreement between the US and Korea, which is 
an indication of US preferences in this policy area. 
The US also reaffirms commitments under the TBT agreement in Chapter 9 of KORUS. There 
is an article on joint cooperation (9.4), which encourages general mutual understanding and 
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provides for sectoral initiatives. On conformity assessments, KORUS is less ambitious than the 
EU–Korea FTA in that the former merely lists a range of six mechanisms, including mutual 
and autonomous recognition of conformity assessment, accreditation and supplier 
declarations. If recognition is requested but not granted, the reasons for not granting 
recognition must be given (see Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2015) for a detailed comparison 
of the TBT chapter in KORUS with that of the EU-Korea FTA). There is a reference to the APEC 
Mutual Recognition Arrangement for Conformity Assessment in Telecommunications, of 
which Korea is a member. KORUS broadly follows the TBT approach on transparency and 
urges the use of electronic forms of communication. But here, as in the general provisions on 
technical regulations, there is only ‘best endeavour” wording for the ‘level directly below that 
of central government’. In other words, state level government in the US is not bound. 
Analogous to the EU-Korea agreement, there is a sectoral committee on regulatory 
requirements for automobiles, which is to work towards joint implementation of the 
regulatory requirements set out by UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe). Additionally, the TBT provisions are to be monitored by a Committee on Technical 
Barriers to Trade on which USTR represents the US. 
The KORUS provisions on SPS are even briefer than those on TBTs. Chapter 8 reaffirms the 
SPS Agreement and establishes an SPS Committee that should ensure that SPS measures rely 
on ‘science and risk-based assessments.’ (Chapter 8(3)).  
In services, KORUS provides some further ‘best endeavours’ wording on transparency and 
the provision of information. Article 12(9) provides for the recognition of qualifications either 
mutually or autonomously, but stresses that there is no requirement to recognise. 
3. Opportunities and challenges 
3.1 Opportunities 
3.1.1 Reduced costs and more competitive markets  
For the Parties, industrial transatlantic regulatory cooperation offers the opportunity of 
reducing the waste of complying with competing – but equivalent – regulatory requirements. 
Better regulatory cooperation can also enhance market access for EU exporters, especially 
small- and medium-sized companies. This is particularly of interest for the leading EU 
exporters to the US in sectors such as automotive, machinery and chemicals in terms of 
regulatory requirements and to US exporters in food and health products and machinery. 
Strong sectors in the EU such as financial services, public transport equipment and 
construction also stand to benefit from increased cooperation in services regulation and 
procurement. All sectors, as well as traders and wholesalers, stand to benefit from a reduction 
in trade costs due to border controls and improved trade facilitation. The TTIP therefore offers 
an opportunity to strengthen international competitiveness and to create more wealth and jobs 
in the EU and the US. The scale of the welfare and trade gains has been the subject of much 
debate (Pelkmans et al., 2014) but gains from reduced costs due to different but equivalent 
regulation represent the most important economic gains from the TTIP.  
3.1.2 Shaping international trade rules and consumer protection levels 
In addition to improving economic growth, the TTIP has been justified on the grounds that it 
will enable the EU and the US to share leadership of the international trading system and 
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shape the trade rules ‘democratically’. Transatlantic trade does account for a significant share 
of world trade. The EU and US are also the most active and advanced actors when it comes to 
addressing regulatory issues in trade and investment. On this view, agreeing to common 
approaches through regulatory cooperation offers the opportunity of setting international 
norms and high levels of consumer protection in this respect.   
It should, however, be remembered that the EU and the US have been doing this for some 
time, whether in the form of shaping the approach to rules on trade in services in the OECD, 
WTO and now in the TiSA (Trade in Services Agreement) or in the negotiations on government 
procurement in the (GPA) Government Procurement Agreement of the WTO. In these fora, 
the agendas and outcomes have been largely shaped by the transatlantic dialogue. In the area 
of technical standards and regulation, this has been much less the case. The EU has 
simultaneously promoted international standards through the markets and bodies such as the 
ISO and IEC. But the success of some leading American standards-making bodies selling their 
technical standards internationally has meant that it has eschewed binding commitments on 
standards. Progress on regulatory cooperation in this area could therefore have a real impact 
on shaping international norms.    
Another area is that of rules of origin. Here the EU and the US are the main actors in shaping 
preferential rules of origin, with the PanEuro and NAFTA models being the two dominant but 
different models. Regulatory cooperation that could bring about a convergence and ideally a 
simplification of these two models would have significant benefits for the rest of the trading 
system. 
Lastly, the existing system of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is subject to reform 
within the TTIP, hence implying the shaping of international trade rules ‘democratically’. In 
response to the EP’s recent resolution, EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström 
emphasised that the old system of ISDS should not and cannot be reproduced in TTIP, and 
that the Parliament’s call for a “new system” must be heard, and it will be (European 
Commission, 2015c). 
3.1.3 Increase consumer welfare and levels of safety 
Increased competition, due to progress in regulatory cooperation, offers the prospect of lower 
prices and an increased variety of goods and services for consumers (Diels & Thoran, 2014). 
Regulatory cooperation could also bring about improved consumer protection and safety. The 
assumption that the level of consumer protection is basically higher or more sophisticated in 
the EU is not sustainable. In place of the EU’s precautionary principle, the US has a stringent 
civil liability system that acts as a means of ensuring high levels of health and safety, via 
liability insurance requirements or induced regulations. For instance, the strong and high level 
of consumer protection regulations on toys and infant and toddler products in the US could 
greatly increase consumer protection and welfare for Europeans in this sector (CFA, 2014). 
Rather than fearing that the EU might trade away their precautionary principle approach to 
regulation, it could be seen as an opportunity to learn from each other’s experience, to 
strengthen regulatory collaboration and to provide more transparency on the use of the PP.  
An intensified exchange of information offers an opportunity to advance consumer policy 
interests. Intensified exchange of information is in line with the existing practice in dealing 
with regulatory divergence and barriers to trade and forms a central element in the proposals 
on regulatory cooperation. Where the TTIP leads to shared approaches, those are more likely 
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to be followed around the world, meaning a regulatory race to the top rather than a race to the 
bottom. 
The TTIP negotiations carry the potential to promote the interests of consumers. For example, 
negotiators could expand opportunities for consumers and micro-businesses by removing 
duties for personal imports, eliminating excessive pricing of telecommunications (i.e. roaming 
fees) and broaden access by consumers to the digital market, for instance, by preventing online 
geographical price discrimination (European Consumer Organisation/BEUC, 2015; Renda & 
Yoo, 2015). However, this potential will only be fully tapped if the narrow focus of negotiations 
is extended to a modern and broad comprehension of consumer welfare (Diels & Thorun, 2014, 
p. 48).  
Making regulations more compatible does not mean going for the lowest common 
denominator, but rather seeing where divergence is unnecessary and where coordination is 
beneficial for both economic interests and consumer welfare. Therefore, impact assessments 
for the purpose of transatlantic regulatory cooperation must not be limited to the impact on 
trade, but also consider consumers’ interests, such as safety, information and sustainable 
consumption as is the case with the holistic approach to impact assessment. The use of impact 
assessment on both sides of the Atlantic also provides scope for the engagement of a variety 
of stakeholders, for example in the common definition of concrete tools to measure the impact 
on consumer safety. 
3.1.4 Momentum for continued EU reform 
In order to keep pace with international competition, the EU should maintain the momentum 
needed for further domestic reforms as a means of boosting its own competitiveness. External 
pressure in the shape of international competition or negotiations with key trading partners 
has always played a role in the development of EU commercial policy and the creation of the 
Single Market. Negotiating TTIP or any agreement with a major developed market economy 
poses more of a challenge for the EU than PTAs with smaller, less-developed economies or 
arguably negotiations in the WTO (with the possible exception of agriculture). But such 
negotiations also offer an opportunity to provide the additional external driver that may be 
needed to break domestic deadlocks on policy reforms due to entrenched vested interests, 
resulting in breakthroughs that will be beneficial for EU consumers and firms as a whole. 
3.2 Challenges 
3.2.1 Making regulatory cooperation a success 
The essential challenge is to make transatlantic regulatory cooperation a success and thus 
tackle the additional (trade) costs resulting from different but equivalent regulation, standards 
or conformity assessment in the US and the EU, whilst ensuring there is no diminution of 
consumer safety and protection or environmental policy objectives. Inevitably, some sectors 
will prove to be difficult or near impossible for substantial regulatory cooperation to take place 
due to grave and irreconcilable concerns that the public may have. Consequently, the EU has 
been explicit in stating the issues that will be exempt from negotiations, such as GMOs and 
beef-with hormones (see Josling & Tangermann, 2014 for more information on agriculture and 
the TTIP) food and data-privacy laws. However, relevant consumer protection associations, 
such as BEUC (European Consumer Organisation, 2015) and the TACD (2015), have expressed 
major concerns that this is not enshrined in the European Commission’s Textual Proposal 
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document. Furthermore, in order to ensure that regulatory cooperation is a success, citizens 
and consumer advocacy groups need increased transparency and involvement, which means 
that the US should follow the EU’s lead in publicising their negotiation proposals and increase 
the public’s involvement (CFA, 2014a; TACD 2015; and European Consumer 
Organisation/BEUC, 2015). 
It is also worth recalling that there have been various previous attempts to promote 
transatlantic regulatory cooperation that have at best been only partially successful. With the 
main economic gains from TTIP projected to come from addressing regulatory barriers, the 
main challenge is to tackle them effectively.  
3.2.2 Dealing with differences in regulatory philosophies and practice 
Beyond the technical difficulties that are involved with regulatory cooperation, one of the 
greatest challenges facing TTIP will be reconciling the different regulatory philosophies, such 
as the difference between the EU’s use of the precautionary principle (PP) and the US reliance 
on science-based risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis 
(‘science-based approach’) (Bergkamp & Kogan, 2013, pp. 495-497). The following section will 
provide a brief overview of both philosophies. 
The precautionary principle enables the EU to invoke more stringent levels of regulation or 
standards in cases when a potential adverse impact on human health or the environment can 
take place and/or there is scientific uncertainty, such as scientific controversy, disagreements 
or a lack of scientific knowledge (von Schomberg, 2006). Prior to drafting legislation, the EU 
normally drafts Impact Assessments as a means of understanding a piece of legislation’s far-
reaching impact (Alemanno, 2014). Even with the European Commission’s Delegated and 
Implementing Acts, Impact Assessments are normally conducted when significant economic, 
environmental or social impacts are expected as a result of the act (Alemanno, 2014). It is worth 
noting that part of the EU’s precautionary principle is anchored in Art. 191(2) TFEU, which 
states that environmental policy should be based on the precautionary principle. So it cannot 
be ‘negotiated away’. That said, this does not prevent the European Commission from entering 
into an agreement that could potentially nullify some of its effects (Bergkamp & Kogan, 2013).  
The US scientific approach to regulation is supported by the central role of the White House 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and the Regulatory Impact Assessments 
(RIAs) that agencies are required to produce. Both are simply based on a science-based cost-
benefit analysis (Alemanno & Parker, 2014), which stands in contrast to the EU’s more 
precautionary and holistic examination of the potential societal and environmental impacts 
that a piece of legislation may have. In place of the precautionary principle, the US has a 
stringent civil liability system that acts as a means of ensuring that health and safety 
regulations and product standards are not lax (Bergkamp & Kogan, 2013). In multiple cases, 
the US Supreme Court has ruled that the US Office of Safety and Health Administration must 
have demonstrated “significant risk” prior to regulation (Wiener & Rogers, 2002, p. 318). 
There may be some signs that the US is inching towards a greater use of precaution in their 
regulatory approaches. For instance, President Obama made reference to precaution in his 
statement on a deep seabed mining policy and the US House of Representatives decided to 
highlight “scientific inadequacy” in its regulatory decision on endangered species (Bergkamp 
& Kogan, 2013, p. 500). However, it would be relatively naïve to believe that the US will 
significantly alter its regulatory philosophy any time soon. 
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Differences in regulatory principles in the EU and US have led many to be concerned that any 
attempt at regulatory convergence in the TTIP may imply deregulation of European consumer 
protection. The greatest concern is that the science-based approach to risk assessment in the 
US differs from the use of the precautionary principle in EU risk assessment. Science-based 
risk assessment has not always been sufficient, as shown in the case of the mad-cow disease 
epidemic. This was an example of science-based risk assessment getting it wrong. This and 
other episodes have influenced thinking in the EU towards more scope for the use of 
precaution, such as in the field of chemicals with the introduction of REACH in the EU 
(Karlsson, 2015). (For a detailed discussion of consumer concerns, see Diels & Thorun, 2014 
and Alemanno, 2014.) However, several studies have demonstrated that, with some possible 
exceptions, the high standards required by both the EU and the US will ensure a high level of 
consumer, health and environmental protection (Bergkamp & Kogan, 2013, p. 507). A further 
study by Fabry & Garbasso (2014, p. 4) suggests that differences between precaution and 
science-based risk assessment have been overplayed and that differences are more due to a 
selective application of precaution to different risks in different places and times.   
3.2.3 Selecting the best options for regulatory cooperation 
The recent literature on approaches to regulatory cooperation from a consumer protection 
standpoint has identified harmonisation, mutual recognition or equivalence and intensified 
exchange of information as options in addressing regulatory divergence.  
Harmonisation 
Harmonisation has been used for voluntary standards but has proven difficult or, at best, very 
time consuming. For consumer protection, the issue is whether the common levels of 
consumer protection represent a levelling up or down. The work on this suggests that contrary 
to fears of a ‘race to the bottom’, there is some evidence of a levelling upwards, as has been the 
case within the US where higher levels of consumer protection in some states have led to a 
levelling up in the quality of consumer protection in a variety of states: the so-called ‘California 
effect’ (Vogel, 1997).  
Mutual recognition or equivalence 
Mutual recognition in its various forms or equivalence can be appropriate when the policy 
goals are the same but the approach used to meet these goals differs. This approach offers the 
prospect of being more effective in reducing the costs of incompatible provisions. It poses no 
threat to consumer protection, provided the goals are indeed equivalent. From a consumer 
perspective, the interest here is to ensure that regulatory cooperation is geared towards 
satisfying consumer interests and not unduly focusing on the removal of regulatory barriers 
to trade or increased trade costs. This is, of course, the basis for the ‘new approach’ to technical 
harmonisation and standards within the EU that led to the success of the Single Market 
programme in the 1980s and 1990s. But in the EU case, it was based on a harmonisation of 
minimum essential requirements as well as a broad approximation of regulatory aims.  
Intensified exchange of information 
Considerable opportunities lie in an intensified exchange of information and research between 
European and US regulators. Informational coordination on issues of common interest 
promises not only greater but also increased consumer protection through mutual learning. 
However, this free flow of information that benefits consumers should never be confused with 
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the flow of commercially valuable personal information regulated under data protection and 
privacy frameworks on both sides of the Atlantic. Moreover, a free flow of information is also 
not necessarily the same as an increased level of transparency. 
In practice, the way in which regulations and standards have been dealt with in trade 
agreements is a little more complicated. Here it is helpful to differentiate between several 
elements.  
Transparency constitutes a fundamental basis of trade agreements. In this context, it involves 
the publication of all regulations and testing procedures as the first essential step to the 
removal of barriers to market access. This can be facilitated by the requirement to use modern 
electronic communications and by ensuring there is a central focal point to answer any 
enquiries concerning regulations.  
Technical regulations are defined in the WTO as measures that are obligatory and laid down 
in national or EU legislation. The TBT agreement requires national treatment, but this does 
not, of course, deal with the trade costs resulting from differing regulations. The alternative 
approach is mutual recognition of regulations, but there are only ‘best endeavours’ wording 
on mutual recognition in the WTO TBT Agreement and most other trade agreements. 
Standards are defined as voluntary measures that may or may not provide a means of showing 
compliance with regulatory requirements. International standards-making bodies cover 
goods, e.g. the International Standards Organisation (ISO), CENELEC (for electrical 
equipment) and for minimum requirements underlying SPS measures, the Codex 
Alimentarius. Both the TBT and SPS agreements make reference to international standards. In 
the former, there are ‘best endeavours’ wording only on the use of international standards and 
a voluntary Code of Good Practice on Standards Making. The SPS agreement urges the use of 
Codex regulatory requirements, but only where these are appropriate (e.g. too low), thus 
allowing significant scope to waive the requirements. Conformity assessment relates to the 
process or procedure by which compliance with agreed standards or regulations are tested. 
Most trade agreements, including the TBT agreement, require national treatment for 
conformity assessment, so that imported products must be tested in the same way as 
nationally produced products. As for technical regulations, this does not address the 
additional costs of complying with unnecessarily complex or different conformity assessment 
measures. So again there is the option of mutual recognition or equivalence of conformity 
assessment. 
Institutional provisions are included in agreements. These usually take the form of committees 
to monitor and promote the application of regulatory cooperation. There may also be specific 
committees, such as in the case of the recent EU–Korea FTA or KORUS discussed above.  
The options discussed above have different implications for regulatory sovereignty and thus 
the scrutiny function of the EP and its committees. Taking each of these in turn, harmonisation 
of voluntary standards is carried out by standards making bodies, the representation in these 
is through the national standards making bodies and on detailed technical work there is strong 
involvement of private sector experts. Agreed international standards are adopted by voting 
in the international bodies in which the European standards-making bodies have a very strong 
presence, which is often still seen in the US as skewing the balance against the ‘more industry-
led’ approach to standards used in the US.   
Mutual recognition can take a number of forms. In the past mutual recognition agreements 
have been based on legislation. If this is the case, legislatures on both sides of the Atlantic will 
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retain regulatory sovereignty. But, as noted above, the reluctance of the regulators and 
legislators to make changes has been a significant impediment in the past. The European 
Commission and the USTR have stated that regulatory cooperation provisions in the TTIP will 
not imply rule-making powers. At this level therefore there would seem to be no threat to the 
regulatory autonomy. The respective legislatures would however, have to exercise effective 
scrutiny.  
The third alternative of intensified exchange of information raises few issues for regulatory 
scrutiny. This option seeks to influence the preparatory phase of regulation. Through 
exchanges of research and thinking on the form and stringency of regulation, incompatibilities 
should be reduced from the outset. The proposed legislation would then be compatible or 
more compatible, but the EP and US Congress would still retain legislative sovereignty. 
3.2.4 Identifying suitable priorities  
In order to make progress, it has been recognised by negotiators on both sides that what is 
needed is to identify those areas where levels of consumer protection are equivalent but the 
means of achieving them differ. In these areas it should be possible to reconcile the procedural 
differences through mutual recognition or acceptance of equivalence, subject of course to 
effective scrutiny to ensure that this does not lead to a reduction in consumer protection that 
would be detrimental to consumer/environmental interests. This chapter suggests that this 
should be possible in sectors such as engineering and automobiles and perhaps in aspects of 
trade facilitation such as supply chain security.  
It will equally be necessary to recognise, as the negotiators appear to have done, that there will 
be some areas in which levels of consumer protection diverge so that the more ambitious forms 
of regulatory cooperation such as mutual recognition in its various forms are inappropriate. 
Such sectors appear to be in REACH in the chemical sector (see Elliot & Pelkmans, 2015) and 
probably significant areas of food safety. In these areas it will be necessary to recognise that 
regulatory cooperation will have to take the form of less ambitious instruments, such as 
intensified exchange of information or joint research on future standards as a means of limiting 
future divergent standards. 
3.2.5 Getting the process right 
The nature of these challenges suggests that regulatory cooperation will have to be a 
continuous process. As has long been recognised in the debate on TBTs, the conclusion of an 
agreement is only the beginning. Real progress in removing regulatory barriers requires more 
or less continuous efforts Again, this is a lesson that has been learned in the EU’s attempts to 
reduce such barriers to the cross-border intra-EU movement of goods, services and factors of 
production. A key challenge in the TTIP is therefore getting the process right. This means 
ensuring that the framework established to carry the work forward is appropriate. In the 
context of the TTIP this means ensuring that the mechanisms, such as the proposed Regulatory 
Cooperation Body (RCB), are effective and transparent. Calls from the TACD (2015) have 
proposed that as a way to boost the effectiveness and transparency of the RCB, consumer 
groups and citizens should be integral to its design and that the good practices of meaningful, 
public and transparent consultations should be enshrined in the TTIP. 
Another key challenge in getting the process right is ensuring that future attempts to 
implement new regulations do not become overly burdensome – more specifically, costly and 
time-consuming. It is important to note that this may have greater implications for the US 
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compared to the EU due to a difference in regulatory systems and legislative functions (TACD, 
2015; VZBV, 2015). 
In the European Commission’s textual proposal document, it states that impact assessments 
and meaningful consultations are required to take place on planned regulatory acts at the 
central level. Furthermore, each Party is required to inform the other Party about proposed 
regulatory acts (at the central level) that will likely have a “significant impact” on 
“international trade or investment…between the parties” (European Commission, 2015a).  
The European Commission’s proposed IA and consultation process may slowdown future 
attempts of implementing new regulations and make it more costly for legislators complying 
with regulatory requirements for three reasons. First, the European Commission’s proposal 
for an increased usage of IAs will most likely result in a greater administrative workload when 
regulations are being proposed. This is especially true for the US where IAs are not as 
frequently employed as it is in the EU (TACD, 2015). This proposal may prove difficult for the 
administrative departments or agencies that are responsible for drafting IA if they are 
overstretched or under-resourced. 
Second, since IAs are not clearly defined in the European Commission’s textual proposal, these 
IAs may be more extensive than the IAs that the US normally conducts. More specifically, 
beyond a cost-effectiveness analysis (which the US IAs primarily focus on), European IAs are 
more ‘holistic’ in that they will also analyse, for instance, social and environmental impacts 
(Alemanno & Parker, 2014). However, US consumer advocacy organisations, such as the CFA, 
are in favour of IAs with a more holistic analysis (CFA, 2014b). 
Third, the European Commission’s interest in binding the US’s sub-federal units to the TTIP 
(i.e. US states) may also magnify the potentially burdensome impacts of IAs and consultation 
(TACD, 2015).  
While some groups, such as the TACD (2015), BEUC (2015) and the VZBV (2015), believe that 
this may cause a “significant slowdown and chill on regulatory processes”, these concerns 
may be over-exaggerated in that the European Commission’s latest textual proposal document 
outlines that each Party will be charged to determine whether a regulatory act will have a 
“significant impact” (European Commission, 2015a). Furthermore, US federal agencies 
proposing “significant” new regulation, already conduct stringent regulatory IAs and 
normally opt for a more consultative process as a means of averting potential judicial reviews 
(Alemanno & Parker, 2014). As for the EU, the European Commission conducts at least broad 
consultations with parties impacted by new proposals for delegated acts and publicises the 
consultation process of an implementing act’s proposal (Alemanno & Parker, 2014). The 
European Commission’s May 2015 proposal for “Better Regulation(s)” will result in a more 
frequent use of Impact Assessments in the Commission’s delegating measures (European 
Commission, 2015d).  
In addition to ensuring that regulatory cooperation is a continuous process once the TTIP is 
concluded, negotiators need to ensure that future attempts of implementing new regulations 
are not overly burdensome.  
3.2.6 Safeguarding regulatory sovereignty: The case of the EU 
A question of interest to MEPs is whether the proposed process poses a challenge for the EU’s 
regulatory sovereignty. The present analysis argues that the European Parliament’s regulatory 
sovereignty, in terms of legislative rule-making authority, is unlikely to be affected by the 
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TTIP. In the discussion so far it has become clear that the RCB will have no rule-making 
powers.  
The EU’s proposed approach to the TTIP has been set out in the initial European Commission’s 
Textual Proposal made public on the 9th February 2015. It should be understood that this is 
only an indication of what might be in the TTIP. The outcome of the negotiations is of course 
unknown at this stage. No US textual proposal has been made available for discussion even 
though regulatory cooperation was the subject of discussion in the 9th round of negotiations 
in New York in the week of the 20th April. The EU text sets out the general aim of ‘reinforcing 
regulatory cooperation’ (Art 1) without restricting the right to regulate in pursuit of legitimate 
public policy objectives, such as ‘a high level of protection of inter alia: the environment; 
consumers; working conditions; human, animal and plant life, health and safety; personal 
data; cyber security; cultural diversity; or preserving financial stability.’ Both the EU and US 
negotiators have repeatedly emphasised that there is no intention to restrict the right to 
regulate levels of consumer protection or any other regulations, neither to lower such 
standards (Fabry & Garbossa, 2014). As the US supports this position there is no reason to 
believe that the final outcome will diverge from this position. 
One area of contention is coverage. The EU’s proposed text refers to cooperation at the level 
of central government (Art. 3), although there is a note that the scope will be reviewed at a 
later stage of the negotiation. At issue here is whether the US will accept an extension to the 
sub-federal, i.e. state level regulation. In a number of regulatory policy areas, the states play 
an important role. In other trade agreements, the US has offered no more than best endeavours 
for the coverage of sub-federal regulation, so including state level regulation in the process 
will be a challenge for the EU.  
According to the EU proposal, transparency provisions would require the parties to provide 
a list of planned regulations ‘at least once a year’. The EU’s proposed approach under 
regulatory policy instruments is that the parties ‘affirm their intention’ to carry out impact 
assessments of planned regulatory acts at the central level (this would mean the EU level and 
the US federal level). In carrying out such impact assessments, the parties shall i) consider how 
the regulation relates to relevant international instruments and ii) take account of the 
regulatory approaches of the other party and the impact on international trade or investment 
(including investors) (Art 7). 
In the course of such impact assessment, the parties would be required to exchange 
information and promote the exchange of experience. Stakeholders would also have to be 
given a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to provide input through public consultations (Art 6). The 
US and the EU currently use impact assessments, but it will be important to assess how this 
meshes with the EU’s regulatory and legislative processes. Impact assessments are widely 
used in the pre-legislative phase in the EU and normally take place for delegated or 
implementing measures (Alemanno & Parker, 2014; Alemanno, 2014). Regulatory cooperation 
in the TTIP could therefore result in a greater use of impact assessments. 
An Annual Regulatory Cooperation Programme would be established to set priorities for 
regulatory cooperation. This is similar to previous transatlantic approaches to regulatory 
cooperation, but an annual programme suggests greater intensity. Since such an approach 
would effectively shape the priorities for the RCB, it would be important for the European 
Parliament to have an input into and provide scrutiny of the programme. 
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Articles 9 and 10 of the EU textual proposal deal with information and regulatory exchanges. 
These are in line with the well-established approach used in long-standing trade agreements, 
such as the provisions on TBT or SPS in WTO or preferential agreement already concluded by 
the EU. The EU proposal does, however, include specific reference to an obligation to inform 
the other party of proposed regulatory acts that ‘do not originate from the executive branch’. 
This appears to be designed to ensure that rule-making emanating from US regulatory 
agencies is also included, and is necessary given the nature of the US system. The regulatory 
exchanges will take place between regulators and competent authorities.  
In Article 11, the proposal includes the central element of promoting regulatory compatibility. 
This shall apply to areas where ‘mutual benefits can be realised without compromising the 
achievement of legitimate public policy objectives’ as set out in Art 1. The text includes a 
number of options, namely: 
• ‘mutual recognition of equivalence of regulatory acts, in full or in part’ … based on 
equivalent outcomes as regards the fulfilment of the public policy goals pursued by both 
parties; 
• harmonisation of regulatory acts, or their essential elements through the application of 
existing ‘international instruments’ (e.g. international standards); 
• the approximation of rules and procedures on a bilateral basis; or 
• simplification of regulatory acts in line with shared principles and guidelines. 
This approach seems balanced and would not undermine the EP’s regulatory sovereignty 
provided the RCB has no rule-making powers. 
The RCB would be composed of ‘regulators and competent authorities’. The expectation must 
be that the competent body on the part of the EU would be the European Commission´s 
Directorate General responsible for the regulatory policy concerned. If this is the case, then 
there can be some assurance that regulatory policy objectives, such as consumer interests, 
would not be less likely to be compromised in the interests of ‘trade’ or market access. But this 
is something the European Parliament should monitor.   
The RCB would have the power to create sectoral working groups. This seems to be in line 
with the typical powers granted to similar committees in other preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs). This is necessary due to the technical nature of regulation and regulatory barriers to 
competition in markets. The RCB would hold a meeting open to the participation of 
stakeholder ‘at least once a year’, prepared with the involvement of the co-chairs of the Civil 
Society Contact Groups. Therefore, formal consultations with civil society are envisaged.  
In summary, the EU’s proposals are based on intensified exchange of information with a view 
to reinforcing regulatory cooperation. The options offered are fairly simple and include 
equivalence/mutual recognition, harmonisation or ‘simplification’. The text includes a 
safeguard in the sense that it expressly reserves the right to regulate in pursuit of high levels 
of protection for consumers and other legitimate public policy objectives. MEPs will wish to 
ensure that this is the case in the final text and that they have an input in the priorities in 
regulatory cooperation, such as through scrutiny of the Annual Regulatory Cooperation 
Programme. 
The research for this chapter has focused on the case of the EU. When it comes to the US, 
regulators and the US Congress have a solid record of defending their regulatory sovereignty. 
As noted above, there is as yet no (published) US textual proposal on the approach to 
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regulatory cooperation. If the (unofficial) text for regulatory cohesion in the TPP is a model, 
however, the US approach would appear to pose no threat at all to regulatory sovereignty as 
the emphasis would be on promoting coherence within the US (and the EU if this approach 
were used in the TTIP). The role of any joint body to set agendas for regulatory cooperation 
across the Atlantic would therefore be less, so there could be no danger that such a body might 
somehow undermine regulatory sovereignty. 
4. Case studies 
4.1 Chemicals 
The area of chemicals entails considerable divergence between US and EU legislation and thus 
marked interest in greater regulatory consistency (for more on chemicals, see Elliot & 
Pelkmans, “Great TTIP ambition in chemicals: Why and how”.) The EU’s central piece of 
legislation is the Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH), which entered into force in June 2007, and streamlines the legislative 
framework on chemicals of the EU. Classification and labelling of substances is governed by 
the so-called CLP (classification, labelling, and packaging) Regulation. Basically, under 
REACH, producers or importers must register chemicals to be put on the market in quantities 
exceeding a certain threshold with the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). As part of the 
registration, they must provide specific information on the properties of the chemicals to 
ECHA. Registrants must also conduct a chemical safety assessment. Certain chemicals, 
included in Annex XIV of the Regulation, are subject to pre-marketing authorisation; criteria 
for including substances into the list are defined (Gerstetter, 2014, p. 30). 
In May 2014, the European Commission published a position paper for the TTIP negotiations 
on chemicals, stating that “neither full harmonisation nor mutual recognition seems feasible 
on the basis of the existing framework legislation in the US (Toxic Substances Control Act, 
TSCA) and EU (REACH)” and that proposals for greater consistency have to be within the 
existing legislative framework of the EU. Although current EU and US regulations on 
chemicals differ, there are areas where the two systems allow for joint work. The position 
paper outlines four areas for which the European Commission proposes to assess possibilities 
for enhanced cooperation with the US via the TTIP:  
1. Prioritisation of chemicals for assessment and assessment methodologies;  
2. Promoting alignment in classification and labelling of chemicals;  
3. New and emerging issues (e.g. endocrine disruptors, nanomaterials); and  
4. Enhanced information sharing among regulators while protecting Confidential Business 
Information (CBI) (e.g. on test data to reduce animal testing). 
This suggests an intensified exchange of information approach, which means in practice that 
US and EU regulators might agree to work together during their assessment through 
evaluating the same substances at the same time and exchanging respective information. This 
bears cost-saving potential for both the companies and the regulators, but it would not change 
the level of protection offered by EU law. The EU decision-making process might be concerned 
by decisions emanating from an US-EU regulatory cooperation, for instance on the inclusion 
of substances in any of the Annexes. In such a case, the European Commission would 
formulate a proposal and the relevant Committee, composed of Member States 
representatives, would be involved. In other decisions under REACH, ECHA itself or the 
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competent authorities of Member States are involved. Thus, TTIP will not change the 
fundamental decision-making structure of the EU.  
The example of chemicals regulation shows that the scope for autonomous decision-making 
by the European Commission is limited, as in major implementing acts a number of actors are 
involved. The goal is to seek opportunities for cooperation between the relevant regulators in 
order to better coordinate certain practices and therefore increase efficiencies and reduce costs 
for authorities and economic units, but without lowering any existing consumer protection 
levels.  
4.2 Automotive sector 
The automotive sector is another industry that could benefit greatly from regulatory 
convergence. (For more on the automotive sector, see Freund & Oliver, 2015). The EU’s 
automotive industry is, after China, the second-largest manufacturer of motor vehicles 
worldwide and it generates millions of jobs – directly and indirectly – EU-wide. The US 
represents by far the largest market for EU automobile exporters (followed by China, Russia 
and Turkey).  
A significant stimulus for transatlantic trade of motor vehicles and parts can be created by 
addressing trade related costs which arise from NTBs, such as different product standards or 
regulations, testing methods, classifications and product labelling. The EU and the US have 
different regulations in relation to lights, door-locks, seat belts, steering and electric windows. 
As these regulations assure a similar level of safety across the Atlantic, there is a wide range 
of regulations where mutual recognition seems possible (Kolev & Matthes, 2014, p. 8). 
Nevertheless, the processes by which the US and EU establish product regulations in the 
automotive industry have very different paths. Contrary to the US system of self-certification, 
the safety of motor vehicles is attested via pre-market government approval in the EU. The 
European vehicle regulations include both EU directives, which must be implemented by the 
member states, and regulations promulgated through UNECE with optional implementation 
by the national governments of the member states. Signatories to the UNECE Agreement 
commit to mutual recognition of approvals for vehicle components. However, the US did not 
join the agreement, as it was not ready to recognise regulations generated outside the US. What 
this means for manufacturers is that they have to run tests twice in order to get cars approved 
in both markets. Besides safety, there exist main differences of regulatory requirements 
between the US and EU concerning fuel economy and emissions requirements (Canis & 
Lattanzio, 2014, p. 5).  
The European Commission’s May 2014 proposal for regulatory cooperation on motor vehicles 
outlines a possible approach to promote regulatory compatibility while achieving the levels of 
health, safety and environmental protection that each side deems appropriate. The ultimate 
goal pursued in the TTIP negotiations concerning the automobile manufacturers is according 
to the EU’s position twofold: 
• “Firstly, the recognition of motor vehicles (and their parts and components, including 
tyres) manufactured in compliance with the technical requirements of one party as 
complying with the technical requirements of the other. […] 
• Secondly, a significant strengthening of EU-US cooperation also in the framework of 
UNECE 1998 Agreement, especially on new technologies.” 
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The first step in the process of mutual recognition of technical requirements is the 
development of a methodological approach enabling regulators to assess whether the 
regulations of one side are equivalent (in terms of, for example, safety levels and 
environmental protection). In areas where equivalence of regulatory outcome can be 
confirmed, “the relevant regulations of the other TTIP partner would have the same legal effect 
as compliance with domestic regulations”. Regarding the second point, the hope is that the 
EU-US cooperation in the framework of the UNECE 1998 Agreement should lead to the 
adoption of Global Technical Regulations in the near future. Strengthening EU-US cooperation 
is considered essential regarding the role of the EU and US as potential regulatory 
requirement-setters in the global automotive industry. The reinforcement of EU-US 
cooperation is already a central element in the field of new technologies such as hydrogen and 
electric vehicles, test-cycle on emissions and advanced safety technologies (Kolev & Matthes, 
2014, p. 26).  
In the context of future regulatory cooperation, it is important to clearly define which measures 
concern TBTs and redundant administrative burdens and which measures are linked to 
desired levels of consumer protection and regulations and should not be altered. The EP’s 
democratic scrutiny over EU regulatory processes will be crucial when creating the framework 
for future cooperation. At the same time, it has to be vigilant about a balanced involvement of 
stakeholders such as the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) and the 
American Automotive Policy Council (AAPC) within the stakeholder consultations included 
in the development of a regulatory proposal.  
In summary, it is of particular interest for the EU to achieve an ambitious TTIP incorporating 
the commitment of the parties to promote regulatory convergence without sacrificing vehicle 
safety or environmental performance.  
4.3 ICT 
The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industry – which is a “combination 
of manufacturing and services industries that capture, transmit and display data and 
information electronically” (OECD, 2012) – is one that can greatly benefit through increased 
regulatory convergence between the US and the EU. However, a sensitive area to consumer 
protection – data privacy measures – may make it particularly challenging for negotiators to 
bridge the regulatory transatlantic divide (for more on the ICT sector, see Renda & Yoo, 2015).  
With the regards to the European Commission’s offensive interests in the ICT sector (European 
Commission, 2015b), regulatory cooperation does not seem to be a significant challenge on 
ICT goods (Renda & Yoo, 2015) For instance, efforts in establishing e-labelling requirements 
are expected to have little difficulty in regulatory cooperation since the US’s E-LABEL Act was 
enacted in November 2014. This measure will especially help SMEs in reducing manufacturing 
costs of digital devices since it gives them the ability to not place labels, stickers and etches of 
regulatory compliance on their (electronic) devices by providing the regulatory compliance 
information digitally in the device’s screen and/or software. Additionally, issues of e-
accessibility – making ICT easier to use by people with disabilities – and interoperability – 
allowing users to exchange data between different products easier – do not seem to be highly 
contentious. The same could also be said about the European Commission’s objectives in 
establishing better enforcement regulations and common principles for certifying ICT 
products, especially in the realm of cryptography. 
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In spite of the EU’s offensive ICT interests, where consumers and firms alike will reap large 
benefits from increased regulatory cooperation, a more uncertain aspect of TTIP’s regulatory 
cooperation lies in one of the European Commission’s primary defensive interests – ICT 
services issues relating to the free flow of data – which has large implications for consumer 
protection. 
Recent concerns with data privacy has prompted the EU to adopt increasingly stricter data 
protection measures, resulting in some countries adopting data localization efforts – legal 
requirements that an organization containing critical data of EU citizens must be physically 
stored in data servers in their respective country (Lakatos, 2014). Stringent data requirements, 
such as the EU’s 1998 Directive on Data Protection, make it challenging for businesses abroad 
to do provide digital goods and services to the EU.  In order to streamline digital trade between 
the EU and US and to ensure that the data of EU citizens were highly protected, the US-EU 
Safe Harbour agreement was created in 2000. Consequently, organizations in the US that 
register to the US-EU Safe Harbour programme must provide certain protections, rights and 
assurances to EU citizens that their data is well-protected. 
However, increased concerns surrounding data privacy in 2013 prompted the European 
Commission to review the US-EU Safe Harbour agreement as they proposed a series of 
reforms to improve the security of personal data. While substantial progress has been made in 
negotiating a reformed Safe Harbour agreement, the EU and US have also been negotiating a 
Data Protection Umbrella Agreement to protect the personal data transferred between the two 
countries for law enforcement purposes since 2011 (European Commission, 2014).  
Despite the European Commission making it clear that it does not want to negotiate on the 
topic of data privacy in TTIP (European Commission, 2013), the US has been keen on including 
some commentary on this in TTIP’s e-commerce chapter as they have tabled a proposal to 
prohibit data localization measures (Lakatos, 2014; Järvinen, 2014). The US Trade 
Representative (USTR) increasingly faces pressure from lawmakers that have made multiple 
attempts in Congress to pass legislation that would give the USTR a stronger mandate against 
data localisation efforts in trade agreements (Bendrath, 2014). For instance, the “Law 
Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad Act”, introduced in February 2015, states, “the 
(USTR) should pursue open data flow policies with foreign nations.” However, there is a 
challenge within the EU as different countries are now exceeding the EU’s requirements on 
data protection by having data localization efforts, which may make regulatory convergence 
all the more difficult on this issue.  
In conclusion, it would be of interest to the EU if they could negotiate provisions similar to 
those in CETA, where Parties are required to respect the international requirements of relevant 
international organisations they are a part of, in TTIP. This would be of great interest to 
consumer advocacy groups, such as the TACD, that demand issues surrounding data flows to 
not be negotiated with (TACD, 2013). In addition to this, it would ideal if such provisions 
could reference the US-EU Safe Harbour agreement and the currently negotiated Data 
Protection Umbrella Agreement. If such provisions could be negotiated to protect the personal 
data of consumers, the EU stands to benefit from regulatory cooperation in the ICT sector in 
the TTIP.  
 
THE TTIP: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION | 19 
 
5. Conclusion 
Focusing on the area of consumer protection, this paper argues that regulatory sovereignty of 
American and European legislators – in terms of the legislative, rule-making ability – is 
unlikely to be affected by the TTIP. The discussion of the European Commission’s recently 
published paper on regulatory cooperation has shown that the provisions are procedural and 
intended to promote, guide, monitor and help facilitate regulatory cooperation. There is, of 
course, as yet no final agreement. The EU’s approach to TTIP as set out in the Textual Proposal 
and the existing EU and US approaches to regulatory cooperation in other PTAs does not 
suggest much of a challenge to the present regulatory sovereignty. The three options for 
addressing regulatory divergence – harmonisation, mutual recognition and intensified 
exchange of information – have different implications for the scrutiny function of the 
legislators and its committees. Transatlantic regulatory cooperation, such as through the 
proposed Regulatory Cooperation Body, will have to identify which areas of regulation are 
suitable for harmonisation, which for mutual recognition/equivalence and which for 
intensified exchange of information. Decisions on this will be taken in the RCB, but any action 
requiring legislative change will be dealt with under existing policy-making procedures. The 
American and European legislators should, along with other institutions, ensure that the work 
of the RCB is transparent. The priorities in regulatory cooperation that will be set by the 
Annual Regulatory Cooperation Programme should be scrutinised to ensure that they reflect 
the broader consumer priorities. 
A final assessment of the impact of transatlantic regulatory cooperation on consumer 
protection can only be made once the process can be observed. Further work will therefore be 
needed to monitor the procedures established and assess whether they are successful in 
making progress on the reducing the costs of different approaches, while ensuring that 
consumer interests are safeguarded.  
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